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Politics, 1641-1660 - John Cunningham 
 
The fractured political landscape that resulted from the disaggregation of Irish 
society in 1641 cannot be adequately surveyed as a whole from any single 
viewing point. It is necessary to pursue instead a blend of differing perspectives, 
while grappling also with the increased multi-centring of elite politics that 
resulted from the outbreak of war across the three Stuart kingdoms. The recent 
and remarkable flourishing of scholarship on the history of Ireland in the mid-
seventeenth century has gone some way towards meeting these considerable 
historiographical challenges, while the enhanced accessibility of key sources via 
digitisation seems set to underpin further worthwhile endeavour. The task of 
this chapter is necessarily more modest: to provide a coherent account of the key 
content and contexts of Irish politics between the 1641 rebellion and the 
Restoration. 
 
Rebellion and Reaction 
By 1641, recent political and military developments in the three Stuart kingdoms 
had served both to weaken the authority of the crown and to create a rich 
breeding ground for plotting and intrigue. Ireland's Catholic elite faced the 
challenges of exploiting the king's weakness so as to extract concessions, while 
also helping him to recover sufficient strength to make good on his promises. 
The first of these challenges could be pursued with some confidence via existing 
political means, but the second one presented enormous difficulties. In this 
context, the example of successful military action offered by the Scottish 
Covenanters proved alluring to some. The plot that led eventually to rebellion 
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can be traced to February 1641, when Rory O'More met Lord Maguire in Dublin 
and sought to persuade him that the Anglo-Scottish conflict had created a 
suitable opening for armed resistance in Ireland. Other leading men of the Ulster 
Irish became involved thereafter, and contact was maintained with Irish forces 
on the continent. O'More, his fellow MP Sir Phelim O'Neill and other future rebel 
leaders had lived through a period of rapid social and economic change and 
O'Neill himself was heavily in debt by 1641. They also feared the prospect of 
religious repression at the same time that a revitalised Irish Catholic church 
harboured ambitions for something more than mere and uncertain toleration.1  
 In October 1641 the failure of the Ulster-led plot to capture Dublin Castle 
gave rise to a complex and unplanned scenario. The rebels had intended to 
overthrow the government and to secure a strong position from which to 
negotiate with the king, while blocking any intervention by the English 
parliament or from Scotland. They hoped too that other Catholic elites across the 
island would lend their support in the aftermath of a successful coup. Instead the 
survival of the government allowed it to remain the crucial arbiter of political 
initiative in the short term. Led by Sir William Parsons and Sir John Borlase, it 
was well positioned to shape external perceptions of the rebellion and to 
obstruct various Catholic attempts to establish contact with the king. In the 
opening weeks of the conflict, Sir Phelim O'Neill in Tyrone and rebel groups in 
several other counties drew up sets of objectives and grievances, encompassing 
issues such as Catholic religious freedom, the protection of their estates and 
                                                        
1 M. Perceval-Maxwell, The outbreak of the Irish rebellion of 1641 (McGill-Queen's University 
Press, Montreal and Kingston, 1994), pp 192-212. 
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defence of the king's prerogative.2 The capture of a large swathe of south Ulster 
and north Leinster was, however, an insufficient basis upon which to go about 
enforcing compliance from Dublin or extracting meaningful concessions from 
Charles I.  
 In the capital cities of the three Stuart kingdoms, the immediate focus was 
on organising an appropriate military response. With the king present in 
Edinburgh, the Scottish parliament professed itself willing to send forces to 
Ireland, but only in co-operation with the English parliament. The latter body 
showed little hesitation about assuming novel authority over Irish matters. 
Significantly, it also shared the Scottish assumption that military assistance was 
to be traded for possession of Irish land. The displaced Irish Protestants who 
flocked to London no doubt helped to foster an emphasis on revenge and on the 
prize of confiscated Catholic estates. Yet deep political divisions and 
uncertainties in Britain would ultimately help to retard the military response to 
rebellion in Ireland. The king's enemies refused to entrust him with control of 
newly raised forces, but the English parliament's authority in this matter was 
also open to question. The inevitable issue of finance also presented difficulties.3  
 Back in Ireland, fears and expectations of rapid and substantial military 
intervention from Britain exercised a key influence on political developments 
amidst widespread mistrust on all sides. The Dublin government's already 
strained relationship with the traditionally loyal Old English Catholics of the Pale 
was further undermined by its reluctance either to furnish them with arms 
against the Ulster rebels or to allow them to pursue a political solution to the 
                                                        
2 Perceval-Maxwell, The outbreak of the Irish rebellion, pp 213-84; N. Canny, Making Ireland 
British, 1580-1650 (Oxford University Press, 2001), pp 461-550. 
3 Perceval-Maxwell, The outbreak of the Irish rebellion, pp 261-84. 
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crisis via the Irish parliament. Baulking at local Catholic offers of mediation and 
assistance, it prorogued the parliament on 17 November and instead looked 
hopefully across the Irish Sea. Cut off from the king and unwanted in Dublin, 
many influential Catholics now began to consider an accommodation with the 
advancing northern rebels. At a series of meetings in Co. Meath, Rory O'More 
took the lead in rehearsing rebel grievances and in asserting their continued 
loyalty to the king. By 7 December the lords of the Pale had decided to make 
common cause with the rebel movement.4 At the same time, Catholics in many 
parts of the country were organising themselves at the county level to control 
and to defend their regions. These developments provided a basis for the 
subsequent establishment of wider co-ordinated Catholic political structures.    
 
The Catholic Confederation  
In the first half of 1642, the impetus for such national structures came from 
several directions. From Connacht, the earl of Clanricarde dispatched an envoy, 
his chaplain Oliver Burke, to consult with the Palesmen. While Clanricarde was 
anxious to quell the growing violence and to engineer a settlement between the 
Catholics and the king, the proposals carried by his chaplain included a plan for a 
provisional civil government in rebel-controlled areas. Shortly thereafter, in 
March 1642, a meeting of senior churchmen at Kells, Co. Meath declared the 
Catholic effort to be a just war and pronounced the excommunication of 
Catholics who declined to support it. The meeting also called for the 
establishment of a central authority. Further consultations took place in 
                                                        
4 Ibid., pp 240-60; A. Clarke, The Old English in Ireland, 1625-1642 (Macgibbon and Kee, London, 
1966), pp 171-92.  
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Kilkenny in May and June, where, a group of clergy and laity endorsed an oath of 
association intended to bind Ireland's Catholics together in defence of 'God, king 
and country'. A provisional executive council was also set up, and preparations 
were made towards elections for a representative assembly.5 The 'confederate 
Catholics' were to govern much of the kingdom until 1649, while also conducting 
peace negotiations and maintaining a diplomatic presence at various European 
courts. 
 The Catholics made significant progress in relation to political structures 
by the summer of 1642, but other developments severely curtailed their grounds 
for optimism. Early in the year their professions of loyalty to the Stuart 
monarchy had been met with a proclamation in which the king called on the 
Catholics to surrender. By April the arrival of substantial military detachments 
from Scotland and England also threatened to overwhelm the various Catholic 
forces. The ruthless character of the conflict in its early stages, encompassing 
massacres of Protestant settlers and vicious reprisals by government forces, 
reduced the possibility of any speedy political compromise.6 In London the 
proliferation of pamphlets that exaggerated the scale of Irish atrocities and 
linked them to alleged plots to root out Protestantism served to harden attitudes 
even further.7 Such literature helped to inform the political context in which the 
Adventurers' Act was passed by the English parliament in March 1642. This 
legislation offered 2,500,000 acres of Irish Catholic land for sale to investors, 
with the resulting monies being earmarked to finance the suppression of the 
                                                        
5 M. Ó Siochrú, Confederate Ireland, 1642-1649: a political and constitutional analysis (Four Courts 
Press, Dublin, 1999), pp 27-42. 
6 Ibid., pp 27-9. 
7 Perceval-Maxwell, The outbreak of the Irish rebellion, pp 269-74; E. Darcy, The Irish rebellion of 
1641 and the wars of the three kingdoms (The Boydell Press, Woodbridge, 2013), pp 77-101. 
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rebellion. The Adventurers' Act was a telling statement of intent, as the English 
parliament intruded further into Irish affairs and committed itself firmly to an 
aggressive policy of mass confiscation.8  
 The arrival of Dr Henry Jones in London around this time seemed likely to 
reinforce this legislative initiative. He carried the damning evidence of 
depositions recently collected from Protestant refugees by a team of 
commissioners in Dublin.9 Despite the high hopes entertained by Jones and other 
Irish Protestants, the outbreak of civil war in England from August 1642 meant 
that the resources intended for Ireland were instead diverted towards domestic 
conflict. For the confederate Catholics, the king's decision to raise his standard 
against the English parliament lent greater credibility to their claims to be acting 
in defence of the royal prerogative. While the return home of Irish émigrés in the 
summer of 1642 boosted the Catholics' military capabilities, the first meeting of 
the confederate general assembly in Kilkenny in October presented a key 
opportunity to progress their political agenda. With representation from all four 
provinces, the confederates devised structures that Micheál Ó Siochrú has 
described as 'a fascinating mixture of conservatism and innovation'.10 This 
'model of government' included a supreme council, which combined executive, 
judicial and administrative functions. This body was also to be accountable to the 
legislative general assembly. The intended roles of provincial and county 
councils were also set out. Among the key objectives formulated at Kilkenny was 
                                                        
8 K. Bottigheimer, English money and Irish land: the adventurers in the Cromwellian settlement of 
Ireland, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971), pp 30-114. 
9 A. Clarke, 'The commission for the despoiled subject, 1641-7', in Brian MacCuarta (ed.), 
Reshaping Ireland, 1550-1700 (Fourt Courts Press, Dublin, 2011), pp 241-60; H. Jones, A 
remonstrance of divers remarkable passages concerning the church and kingdome of Ireland 
(London, 1642). The 1641 depositions can be viewed at http://www.1641.tcd.ie. 
10 Ó Siochrú, Confederate Ireland, pp 44-50. 
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the restoration of the privileges enjoyed by the Catholic church before the 
Henrician Reformation. This issue would loom large in subsequent negotiations 
with Charles I, to whom the confederates at Kilkenny reaffirmed their 'true 
allegiance'.11 They would spend the following six years trying to negotiate a 
peace settlement that could surmount not only the tensions that existed around 
loyalty to church and crown, but also the conflicts that raged within and between 
various parties of clergy and laity.    
 
Towards a Truce 
As turmoil engulfed the three Stuart kingdoms, political division and factionalism 
was far from unique to Kilkenny. Key members of the Dublin administration 
quickly adopted differing positions on a range of issues, not least the terms on 
which a settlement should be reached in Ireland. From late 1642 efforts made by 
both the king and the English parliament to secure political and military support 
in Dublin caused further difficulties within the Irish council. Sir William Parsons 
and others who opposed any compromise with Irish Catholics tended towards 
sympathy with the English parliament, which was committed to a hard line 
against the confederates.12 The royalist position, personified in the Irish context 
by the earl of Ormond, was more pragmatic. As the three kingdoms continued in 
a state of flux throughout the mid-1640s, Ormond explored a range of political 
options, seeking an alliance that would best protect the interests both of 
Ireland's Protestants and of the crown. This complex process encompassed his 
negotiations with the confederate Catholics. Ormond was closely related to many 
                                                        
11 Ibid., pp 44-54. 
12 R. Armstrong, Protestant war: the 'British' of Ireland and the wars of the three kingdoms 
(Manchester University Press, 2005), pp 43-83. 
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leading confederates and his master was keen to strike a deal with the Catholics 
that would allow him to withdraw forces from Dublin to England. In January 
1643 Charles authorised Ormond and Clanricarde to meet with the confederates 
and to hear their grievances. At this point, the king also set out his position on 
what were likely to be the key issues. While he showed some understanding of 
Catholic discontent at the English parliament presuming to legislate for Ireland, 
he was unwilling to make religious concessions or to make changes around 
Poyning's Law, a statute that limited the independence of the Irish parliament. 
Charles was also determined to block any reversal of land transfers pre-dating 
1625 and to retain his control over appointments to office in Ireland.13 While the 
king's stance would prove unsatisfactory to many confederates, a more 
conciliatory approach would have cost him much support both in Britain and 
among the Protestants of Ireland.  
 The confederates in turn set out their position in a remonstrance 
presented at Trim on 17 March 1643. In this document, they complained of the 
various legal disabilities under which Irish Catholics laboured and denounced 
the Adventurers' Act. In return for concessions from the king on Poyning's Law 
and other matters, they held out the prospect of substantial financial and 
military assistance. The confederates also directed fierce criticism at the lords 
justice, and especially Parsons, accusing them of goading Catholics into 
rebellion.14 Charles had already been preparing to remove Parsons from office 
and he issued the relevant order in early April. The Dublin government's ability 
to resist compromise was further curtailed a few months later when the king 
                                                        
13 Ó Siochrú, Confederate Ireland, pp 61-2. 
14 Ibid., pp 62-3. 
 9 
ordered that Parsons and three of his colleagues be removed from the Irish 
council altogether.15 In the mean time, the collapse of English peace negotiations 
at Oxford had increased the king's need for support from Ireland. The 
confederates' willingness to provide this support was further signalled in May 
1643 when the general assembly appointed a delegation to negotiate a truce. 
Although a newly arrived papal envoy, Pier Francesco Scarampi, voiced 
objections, by 15 September a twelve-month armistice had been agreed. For the 
confederates, this appeared to create the space needed for meaningful 
negotiations.16   
 For Ormond, the truce was a mixed blessing. While Charles promoted him 
to the office of lord lieutenant shortly afterwards, the English parliament 
threatened to impeach him as a traitor. In the short term, the truce created 
unrest among substantial sections of the Irish Protestant community, including 
Lord Inchiquin and his forces in Munster. Its political impact was also felt in 
London, where it reinforced the parliament's efforts to undermine the king by 
associating him with the Irish Catholic cause. Because the Irish truce created the 
prospect of strengthened royalist armies in England, it encouraged the 
parliament to enter into an alliance with the Scots: the solemn league and 
covenant. This pact included a commitment to the introduction of Presbyterian 
church government across the three kingdoms. Subsequent efforts to persuade 
Protestants in Ireland to support the covenant tied its acceptance to the promise 
of increased material support from Westminster. These efforts proved most 
                                                        
15 Armstrong, Protestant war, pp 83-5, 92-3. 
16 Ó Siochrú, Confederate Ireland, pp 67-8. 
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successful in the north, where the sizeable Scots and local Protestant forces were 
gradually detached from the royalist cause.17  
 
The Quest for Settlement  
With sections of the Irish Protestant community agonising over the covenant, the 
confederates turned their attention to negotiations with the king. In March 1644 
a confederate delegation reached the royal court at Oxford. It was led by 
Ormond's brother-in-law Viscount Muskerry. They were followed shortly 
afterwards by a group of Dublin-based Protestants who were determined to 
block any settlement.  As before, the confederates offered military support to the 
king in exchange for a range of political, religious and legal concessions, 
including an act of oblivion for all offences committed since 1641. In response, 
the Irish Protestant agents sought reparation for their losses in the rebellion, the 
suppression of Catholicism and various other measures. The proceedings at 
Oxford highlighted some of the key obstacles that existed to a negotiated 
settlement, and led the king to refer the whole business back to Ormond in 
Ireland.18  
 By the time that fresh negotiations got underway in the autumn, Ormond 
had lost the support of further sections of the Protestant community, most 
notably in Munster. His determination to avoid major concessions on religion 
and other vital matters helped to ensure that no breakthrough was achieved. 
Ormond was not helped by the lack of clear instructions from the king. This 
factor, along with his need to protect his narrowing Protestant support base 
                                                        
17 Armstrong, Protestant war, pp 92-118. 
18 Ibid., pp 119-20; Ó Siochrú, Confederate Ireland, pp 70-3. 
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placed Ormond in an extremely difficult position; Barry Robertson has suggested 
that his task 'probably bordered on the impossible'.19 The differing expectations 
of the three main groupings within the confederate movement, characterised by 
O'Siochru as the clerical, the moderate and the peace factions, were also set to 
have an increasingly disruptive effect on attempts at settlement.20 By the spring 
of 1645, with no agreement in sight, the king was privately signalling his 
willingness to concede to confederate demands. With his prospects in England 
looking increasingly bleak, he had also grown desperate enough to pursue 
avenues other than Ormond's peace talks.    
 Following defeat at the battle of Naseby in June 1645, the possibility of 
military assistance from Ireland appeared to offer Charles's best hope of 
continuing the fight. The potential value of such an intervention had recently 
been demonstrated on a smaller scale in Scotland by an Irish expeditionary force 
organised by the earl of Antrim.21 A few weeks after Naseby the earl of 
Glamorgan, a Welsh Catholic royalist, arrived in Ireland.  With the talks between 
Ormond and the confederates floundering on the crucial issue of ecclesiastical 
property, Glamorgan moved to negotiate a separate and comprehensive religious 
settlement. Agreement was reached by the end of August; in return for an army 
of 10,000 men, Glamorgan conceded the public exercise of Catholicism and other 
key points. Controversy surrounded the question of whether or not Charles had 
authorised the earl to make such far-reaching concessions, and the extent to 
                                                        
19 B. Robertson, Royalists at war in Scotland and Ireland, 1638-1650 (Ashgate, Farnham, 2014), pp 
99-123; Armstrong, Protestant war, pp 121-3. 
20 Ó Siochrú, Confederate Ireland, pp 73-5, 83-6. 
21 J. Ohlmeyer, Civil war and restoration in the three Stuart kingdoms: the political career of 
Randall McDonnell, marquis of Antrim, 1608-1683 (Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp 129-51. 
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which Ormond was privy to Glamorgan's dealings remains unclear.22 In any case, 
various issues not covered by Glamorgan's secret treaty remained as obstacles to 
the wider political settlement upon which depended the confederates' speedy 
dispatch of military aid to the king. Another avenue pursued by the royalists, via 
the exiled Queen Henrietta Maria and Sir Kenelm Digby, was a direct treaty with 
Pope Innocent X. In Rome in November, Digby agreed to terms even more 
favourable than those granted by Glamorgan to the Irish Catholics.23 By that 
point, however, a more meaningful papal intervention was already underway. 
  
Rinuccini and the Ormond Peace 
On 12 November 1645 Archbishop Giovanni Battista Rinuccini arrived in 
Kilkenny. As a papal nuncio, he became the most senior member of the corps 
diplomatique at the confederate capital. Rinuccini is the best known and most 
controversial of the many diplomatic agents who moved between Ireland and 
the continent in the mid-seventeenth century. The confederate representatives 
abroad, mostly clerics, sought official recognition and financial backing for their 
cause. Their main focus was on the major Catholic courts, where they could 
portray the Irish conflict as a religious war. Yet Ireland's established position as 
a minor dependent kingdom under the Stuart monarchy helped to ensure that 
France and Spain, mainly concerned with their own inter-rivalry, would refuse to 
engage fully with a confederate movement whose legitimacy was very much 
open to question. While limited supplies and some agents were sent, these 
                                                        
22 Ó Siochrú, Confederate Ireland, pp 87-8, 93-5; P. Corish, 'The rising of 1641 and the Catholic 
confederacy, 1641-5', in T.W. Moody, F.X. Martin and F.J. Byrne (eds.) A new history of Ireland, iii: 
early modern Ireland, 1534-1691 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976) pp, 314-16; Armstrong, 
Protestant war, pp 139-42. 
23 Ó Siochrú, Confederate Ireland, pp 95-6, 99-100. 
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hesitant allies expected and received payback in the form of military manpower. 
The papacy was rather more enthusiastic about securing Ireland for Catholicism, 
but it could not offer the substantial financial or military supplies needed to 
bring this about.24 Its main representative in Ireland, Rinuccini, would 
nonetheless exert a major influence on confederate politics after 1645.  
 Tadhg Ó hAnnracháin has shown how Rinuccini's mission was intended 
as the culmination of the gradual process whereby a resident and pastorally 
active Catholic hierarchy was put in place in Ireland after 1618. This influential 
grouping had been educated on the continent, where they were imbued with the 
confidence of the Catholic reformation. As a result, their objectives aligned with 
the main purpose of Rinuccini's mission: to establish the full and free practice of 
Catholicism in Ireland.25 The nuncio's disruptive presence provided 
encouragement to those within the confederate movement who had already 
begun to express their disquiet at the failure to extract firm religious concessions 
from Ormond. Rinuccini was thus able to exploit existing tensions in pursuit of 
his own ends. Before long he had extracted further concessions from Glamorgan, 
including the appointment of a Catholic lord lieutenant and the admittance of 
Catholic bishops into the Irish house of lords.26 The political fallout from the 
death of one of these bishops would soon disabuse Rinuccini of the notion that 
he had swiftly secured the future of Irish Catholicism.  
 In October 1645 Archbishop Malachy O'Queely of Tuam was killed in a 
skirmish near Sligo. His copy of the secret terms agreed in August between 
                                                        
24 J. Ohlmeyer, 'Ireland independent: confederate foreign policy and international relations 
during the mid-seventeenth century, in eadem (ed.), Ireland from independence to occupation, 
1641-1660 (Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp 89-111. 
25 T. Ó hAnnracháin, Catholic reformation in Ireland: the mission of Rinuccini, 1645-1649 (Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pp 5-6, 39-81. 
26 Ibid., pp 123-6; Ó Siochrú, Confederate Ireland, pp 83-5, 96-8. 
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Glamorgan and the confederates was duly discovered and swiftly dispatched to 
London, where it provided rich pickings for the parliament's propagandists.27 By 
Christmas Ormond had become aware of the resulting publication. Realising its 
potential implications both for himself and the wider royalist cause, he had 
Glamorgan arrested in Dublin and charged with treason. Under Rinuccini's 
influence, the confederate supreme council reacted by demanding Glamorgan's 
release and by summoning a general assembly. When it convened early in 
February 1646, Rinuccini led the opposition to a final agreement with Ormond. 
Although Glamorgan had been released by this stage, the nuncio insisted that his 
earlier arrest had destroyed the credibility of his treaty with the confederates. 
He instead persuaded his audience to await full confirmation of the generous 
terms agreed between the pope and Sir Kenelm Digby, of which only a coded 
copy had reached Kilkenny. On this issue, the confederate leadership agreed to 
wait until 1 May, while pressing ahead at the same time in the long-running 
negotiations with Ormond.28  
 The peace treaty that was eventually signed in secret at Dublin on 28 
March was the result of a torturous process that had been stretched out over 
three years. Its terms included promise of a general pardon for all actions since 
1641, the reversal of Stafford's plantations and abolition of the court of wards. 
Catholics were, moreover, to be allowed to occupy public office upon taking an 
oath of allegiance, as opposed to the oath of supremacy. Rather than providing a 
basis for settlement, however, the treaty would ultimately cause ructions within 
the confederate movement. A key point of disagreement subsequently was the 
                                                        
27 The Irish cabinet, or, His Majesties secret papers, for establishing the papall clergy in Ireland, with 
other matters of high concernment, taken in the carriages of the Archbishop of Tuam, who was slain in 
the late fight at Sliggo in that kingdom (London, 1645). 
28 Ó Siochrú, Confederate Ireland, pp 98-101; Ó hAnnracháin, Catholic reformation, pp 129-30. 
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extent to which the text of the treaty agreed in March differed from what had 
been discussed by the general assembly in the previous month. The further 
deterioration of the king's position around this time also shaped the political 
context in which the peace treaty was signed and disseminated. Before 
agreement was reached in Dublin, Charles had already publicly disowned 
Glamorgan and his religious treaty with the confederates. Any remaining hope 
that Charles would instead endorse Digby's treaty with the pope was dashed 
when the king surrendered himself to the Scots in April 1646. These 
developments meant that the vague promise in the Ormond peace treaty of 
'further concessions' on religion appeared to carry little or no weight.29  
 The confederate leadership, anxious for reconciliation with Ormond and 
the royalists, now faced a major dilemma. Although Glamorgan had been 
discredited, the publication of the Ormond peace treaty unaccompanied by the 
Welsh earl's religious concessions was likely to alienate the clerical party and 
split the confederate movement. Ormond was, however, opposed to the 
publication of Glamorgan's terms, while Clanricarde advised that such a move 
would do nothing to assist the king, who was by now firmly in the grip of the 
Presbyterian Scots. These issues dominated a meeting of confederate leaders 
that took place in Limerick early in June 1646. It was here that a furious 
Rinuccini at last learned that the terms of the Ormond peace treaty had already 
been finalised back in March. Pointing to the collapse of the king's cause in 
England, and emboldened by Owen Roe O'Neill's victory over a Scots army at 
Benburb, the nuncio now argued in favour of an outright Catholic conquest of 
                                                        
29 Ó Siochrú, Confederate Ireland, pp 100-6, 109-11; Ó hAnnracháin, Catholic reformation, pp 134-
7. 
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Ireland. Having failed to win support for this stance, Rinuccini departed to attend 
a planned ecclesiastical congregation in Waterford. Meanwhile George Digby had 
arrived in Dublin, bringing word of the king's approval of the peace treaty that 
had been agreed with the confederates in March.30    
 This news led Ormond to publish the peace treaty in Dublin on 30 July. 
The supreme council followed suit three days later and began its preparations to 
receive Ormond in Kilkenny. This caused the simmering tensions within the 
confederate movement to erupt. Within days Rinuccini and the Catholic church 
leaders who were gathered at Waterford had rejected the peace. They proceeded 
to declare its acceptance a breach of the confederate oath of association and 
threatened its main backers with excommunication. With support from the 
Catholic towns and key army commanders, Rinuccini and his allies quickly 
dismantled the peace treaty and, following a brief attempt at reconciliation, 
imprisoned some leading members of the peace faction. The nuncio was 
thereafter installed as president of a reconstituted supreme council, which was 
to rule in association with the ecclesiastical congregation. Determined to 
consolidate his political triumph, Rinuccini turned his thoughts to a military 
assault on the capital.31 Having been forced by the unexpected turn of events to 
retreat in haste from Kilkenny to Dublin, Ormond had now to weigh other 
options, including surrender to the English parliament.  
 
 
 
                                                        
30 Ó Siochrú, Confederate Ireland, pp 106-9; Ó hAnnracháin, Catholic reformation, pp 136-8. 
31 P. Corish, 'Ormond, Rinuccini and the confederates, 1645-9', in Moody et al., A new history of 
Ireland, iii, pp 320-1; Ó Siochrú, Confederate Ireland, pp 108-17. 
 17 
Protestant Alternatives  
Ormond had invested considerable energy in the high-profile negotiations with 
the confederates, but he had also proven willing to explore other means to 
secure his ends. The details of these complex initiatives have been reconstructed 
in the work of Robert Armstrong and others. For example, Armstrong has drawn 
attention to Ormond's efforts in the summer of 1645 to create 'a cross-religious 
third force' attractive to disillusioned sections of both the confederate and 
covenanter movements.32 Kevin Forkan has stressed the significance of 
Ormond's secret dealings, via Humphrey Galbraith, with potential allies in 
Protestant Ulster in 1645-6.33 Ormond was clearly keen then to pursue 
alternatives that would enable him to avoid major concessions to, and 
dependence upon, the confederate Catholics. An accommodation with the 
English parliament offered yet another possible means to avoid a treaty with the 
confederates. Just as in Kilkenny, Ormond also had influential allies at 
Westminster. When English parliamentarians became polarised into 
'Presbyterian' and 'Independent' parties in the mid-1640s, most of Ormond's 
contacts gravitated to the former grouping. His good relations with influential 
Presbyterian politicians such as Denzil Holles helped to enable the prospect of an 
agreement to be explored in the second half of 1645. This endeavour was, 
however, extremely vulnerable to any change in the political landscape at 
Westminster.34  
                                                        
32 Armstrong, Protestant war, pp 137-8 
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 Such a change occurred in January 1646 when the English parliament 
appointed Viscount Lisle as commander-in-chief of a projected Irish 
expeditionary force. Lisle was ultimately named as the parliament's lord 
lieutenant of Ireland for a twelve-month period, commencing in April 1646. He 
was closely identified with the anti-Scottish party at Westminster; the political 
Independents opposed to the policies of Ormond's Presbyterian friends. Lisle's 
appointment by parliament put him in direct competition with Ormond, whose 
authority was derived from the king. The Independents' determination to row 
back on the solemn league and covenant and to limit Scottish political influence 
in post-war England also coloured their approach to Ireland. The eventual result 
was a plan for a distinctly English reconquest of Ireland, led by Lisle.35 The 
political momentum that developed behind this plan by the beginning of 1647 
drew upon the enthusiasm and experience of a group labelled by Patrick Little as 
'the Irish independents'. With its roots in the pro-plantation Boyle circle of the 
pre-war period, its most notable member was Sir John Temple, one of those who 
had been dismissed from the Irish privy council along with Parsons in 1643.36 
Temple's opposition to any compromise with the confederates was given full 
vent in his book The Irish rebellion, which was published in London in 1646. This 
influential work, which made extensive use of evidence from the 1641 
depositions, was designed to vindicate a harsh military solution to the Irish 
problem. 37 The middle ground from which Ormond sought to construct alliances 
with confederates, covenanters and others was to be rendered scorched earth.  
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 Lisle eventually made his way to Munster in February 1647, where his 
political and religious outlook quickly alienated some powerful local interests. 
Before long Inchiquin, the parliament's lord president of Munster, began efforts 
to mobilise opposition to Lisle at Westminster. Lisle's fate was sealed shortly 
thereafter by a further shift in the balance of power within the English 
parliament. Amidst wider moves by the Presbyterians against both their 
Independent rivals and the increasingly powerful New Model Army, Lisle's Irish 
commission was allowed to lapse in April.38 These alterations reopened the 
prospect of an agreement between the parliament and Ormond. At Kilkenny in 
February 1647 a new general assembly had reinforced the clergy's earlier 
rejection of the Ormond peace treaty, and fresh confederate efforts at 
negotiation with Dublin made little headway.39 Ormond was now increasingly 
inclined to surrender the capital to parliamentarian forces, rather than pursue 
any further talks with the confederates. The necessary treaty was signed on 19 
June 1647, paving the way for Colonel Michael Jones to take command in 
Dublin.40  
 
Royalism Revived  
This development, and the series of disastrous military defeats suffered by the 
confederates over the months following, set the scene for a tense meeting of the 
confederate general assembly in November. Events in England also appeared to 
offer no respite, as the New Model Army had gained custody of the king and 
marched on London in August to secure its Independent allies in control of the 
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parliament. By this point Rinuccini had stepped down from the supreme council 
and a number of the men overthrown by him in 1646 had returned to positions 
of influence.41 Unsurprisingly, the Stuart monarchy remained central to 
confederate political calculations. The public hangman at Kilkenny was duly 
ordered to burn a radical tract penned by a Lisbon-based Irish Jesuit, Conor 
O'Mahony, in which he advocated the election of a native king.42 The 
confederates instead weighed up the possibilities of negotiating with Queen 
Henrietta Maria and of seeking the protection of a foreign prince. After 
considerable wrangling, agents were appointed to travel to Paris, Madrid and 
Rome. The confederates' main objective was to secure an agreement with the 
Stuart court in exile, which was to incorporate religious clauses approved by the 
pope. The relevant agents eventually took ship on 10 February 1648.43 
 At the end of the previous year, Charles had signed an engagement with 
the Scots, with a view to building a new royalist alliance. The king hoped to 
capitalise on divisions within and between the English parliament and its army, 
with Ormond once again designated to play a key role in Ireland. Ormond 
travelled to France in February 1648, where the confederate envoys had arrived 
at the exiled royalist court. Following advice from Ormond, Henrietta Maria 
determined that once again negotiations between the lord lieutenant and the 
confederates offered the best way forward. The return to the royalist fold of 
Inchiquin's Munster forces and the Scots in Ulster was also to be pursued. Back 
in Ireland, Ormond's envoy Colonel John Barry sought to engineer a truce 
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between Inchiquin and Kilkenny. Rinuccini was opposed to this, in part because 
he feared that a truce would open the way for Ormond's return. After attempting 
to rally episcopal support, the nuncio fled from Kilkenny on foot of an alleged 
assassination plot against him.44  
 From this low point, the road to civil war among the confederates was 
short. Having taken refuge with Owen Roe O'Neill in the midlands, Rinuccini 
learned of the truce with Inchiquin, signed on 20 May. He also received false 
intelligence that Thomas Preston's Leinster forces were on the march to attack 
O'Neill's camp. Determined to repeat the tactics that had proven effective in 
1646, Rinuccini and some bishops pronounced the excommunication of all who 
supported the Inchiquin truce. This time, however, he met with opposition not 
only from the supreme council but also from a substantial part of the episcopate. 
The supreme council decided on an appeal to Rome and seized control of the 
Jesuit printing press in Kilkenny to prevent the easy circulation of the nuncio's 
decree of excommunication. Over the months following, the council continued to 
outmanoeuvre and progressively to isolate the nuncio, who had relocated to 
Galway. When a new general assembly met on 4 September 1648, Ormond's 
return was imminent and those who backed an agreement with him appeared to 
be in the ascendant at Kilkenny.45 Unfortunately for them, the wider royalist 
movement was again in turmoil after Oliver Cromwell's defeat in of an invading 
Scottish army at Preston in August.  
 Despite the growing urgency for a settlement, the second Ormond peace 
treaty was not formally signed until 17 January 1649. Religious issues had again 
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proved to be the main sticking point, in particular the question of ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction. News that Charles was to be put on trial for his life was one of the 
factors that helped to move matters towards a conclusion. But the executioner's 
axe ensured that the king would never have opportunity to accept, to reject or 
perhaps to fudge the terms that Ormond had agreed on his behalf. The 
confederate government was promptly dissolved, with twelve commissioners of 
trust being appointed to manage Catholic-controlled areas. The Ulster Scots, 
horrified by the regicide, were also reconciled to the lord lieutenant, who now 
derived his authority from the new king, Charles II. Although O'Neill held back 
from joining this royalist alliance, Rinuccini left Galway and sailed for home.46   
 
The Politics of Conquest and Defeat 
Having at last secured a peace treaty with the Catholics, Ormond was now 
determined to win full control of the kingdom. Unfortunately for him, Michael 
Jones in Dublin and a handful of other commanders remained loyal to the English 
parliament. To make matters worse, the marquis of Antrim and other Catholics 
who opposed the peace had begun to explore the possibility of an alliance with 
the parliament. While the latter talks ultimately came to nothing, they 
encouraged the Irish involved to refrain from joining Ormond.47 Meanwhile 
Oliver Cromwell was appointed in March 1649 to lead an expedition to Ireland. 
The leaders of the newly founded commonwealth could point to a range of 
justifications for a conquest: the royalist and Catholic threat from Ireland; 
revenge for 1641; the acquisition of Irish land to satisfy the adventurers; and the 
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need for military success to boost the regime's popularity at home.48 These 
motivations were underpinned by a wide domestic consensus on England's right 
to rule the neighbouring island, although there were some dissenting voices on 
this point.49 In May Sir William Parsons approached the council of state with a 
tract that he had penned to rehearse and to justify English dominion from 
earliest times to the present.50 Against this background, leveller-inspired unrest 
in the parliament's army was quickly crushed and Cromwell prepared to cross 
the Irish Sea.51  
 The massacres committed by Cromwell's troops at Drogheda and 
Wexford in the autumn of 1649 are among the most controversial episodes of 
the period. When the Catholic bishops gathered at Clonmacnoise towards the 
end of the year, they were able to point to those recent excesses as evidence that 
the English parliament was intent on 'the destruction of the lives of the 
inhabitants of this nation'.52 From his winter quarters in Munster, Cromwell 
responded to the bishops by publishing a furious tirade against Catholicism, 
within which he included vague promises of favour to those who had not played 
prominent roles in the conflict. If his overtures made little impression on 
Ireland's Catholics, the same could not be said for the Protestants. Even before 
his arrival in Ireland, Cromwell had won over Lord Broghill, a figure of 
considerable influence in Munster. Late in 1649 Broghill helped to persuade 
Protestant garrisons in the south to defect from the faltering royalist cause. By 
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the end of April 1650 Cromwell had agreed terms with most of the remaining 
Protestant royalist forces.53 Under the pressure of war, Ormond's broad but 
fragile alliance had quickly fallen apart. Some respite was provided by O'Neill's 
belated decision to join forces with Ormond, but the general's death in 
November 1649 deprived his army of effective leadership. At Cromwell's 
departure from Ireland six months later, his army controlled a large swathe of 
territory. By contrast, Ormond had been reduced to threatening to leave the 
country unless the recalcitrant city authorities in Limerick and Galway agreed to 
admit royalist garrisons.54  
 Faced with this bleak scenario, Charles II eschewed an expedition to 
Ireland and opted instead to travel to Scotland in June 1650, where he 
subscribed to the covenant. By August the king had disowned the Ormond peace 
treaty, although he secretly informed Ormond that he had done so only out of 
political necessity. In any case the Catholic bishops, increasingly frustrated by 
successive military failures, had by this time run out of patience with the lord 
lieutenant. Recent meetings, including an assembly attended by Ormond at 
Loughrea in April, had failed to resolve Catholic grievances around issues such as 
military appointments and alleged financial corruption. At a gathering in 
Jamestown, Co. Leitrim in August, the Catholic bishops agreed upon a public 
declaration outlining Ormond's alleged failure to uphold the 1649 peace treaty, 
his neglect of the Catholic interest and his ineffective management of the war 
effort. Having expressed their preference for a revival of confederate power 
structures, the bishops urged Ormond to depart the kingdom. Ormond 
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characteristically refused to bend to the will of the Catholic episcopate, but his 
position was becoming increasingly untenable. News of Cromwell's victory over 
the Scots at Dunbar on 3 September cast a further shadow over the royalist 
cause.  After a period of sustained bickering with the bishops, Ormond went into 
exile in December.55  
 Ormond's position at the head of the royalists in Ireland was taken over 
by Clanricarde. On the opposite side, Henry Ireton had succeeded Cromwell, his 
father-in-law, in mid-1650. With their military fortunes in decline, Clanricarde 
and other Catholic leaders were increasingly attracted to the prospect of aid 
from the continent, this time from Charles, duke of Lorraine. Exiled from his 
patrimony by the French in the 1630s, Lorraine had pursued a successful career 
as a military contractor under the Habsburgs. By the 1650s he controlled 
substantial resources of men and money. Lorraine was gradually drawn into 
discussions around a series of disjointed proposals that emanated from different 
sections of the Irish political elite. He was most enthused by the notion of 
becoming 'protector' of the kingdom of Ireland, but in April 1651 Clanricarde, 
anxious to prevent any diminution of Stuart sovereignty, blocked this scheme.56 
As the royalist and Catholic leaders continued to strive desperately for a means 
to turn the tide of the war, Ireton led his forces across the River Shannon. 
 Such breakthroughs helped Ireton to contain emerging divisions within 
his regime. Although he had welcomed the arrival in January 1651 of four 
commissioners appointed by the Rump parliament to rebuild a civil government 
in Ireland, their presence had quickly generated tensions. The approach taken by 
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one of the commissioners, John Weaver, was to become a particular source of 
grievance to English army officers in Ireland. Weaver did not hesitate to voice his 
displeasure at the extreme methods being employed by the officers in their 
attempts to pacify restless areas, including the widespread killing of civilians. As 
a religious Independent, he was also alarmed at the rapid spread of Baptist 
beliefs within the army. Following Ireton's death in November 1651, the 
republican Weaver attempted to bring the army in Ireland to heel by imposing 
tighter civilian control, but he met with concerted opposition both from his 
fellow commissioners and from leading army officers. In April 1652 he retreated 
to Westminster, where his continued efforts to weaken the army's dominance of 
developing state structures in Ireland fed into the growing rift between the 
parliament and military interests in England.57   
  Weaver's return to London contributed to a long overdue increase in 
English political attention to Irish affairs. Over the previous two years the 
royalist threat from Scotland and infighting over reform were among issues that 
had dominated the agenda at Westminster. Amongst the matters that had been 
neglected was a scheme drawn up by Ireton in March 1651 as he sought to bring 
an end to the conflict in Ireland. Borrowing from the approach employed by the 
English parliament as it endeavoured to reach a settlement with the king in the 
1640s, Ireton proposed a sliding scale of punishments for his enemies in Ireland. 
There could be no mercy for anyone implicated in the 1641 rebellion, but the 
'lower orders' and those who had not been heavily involved in the confederate or 
royalist movements were promised more lenient treatment. Landowners, apart 
                                                        
57 J. Cunningham, 'The Rump parliament, Cromwell's army and Ireland', English Historical Review, 
129 (2014), pp. 830-45. 
 27 
from those who could demonstrate 'constant good affection' to the interest of the 
English commonwealth, were faced with at least partial confiscation of their 
estates. Although Ireton's 'qualifications' were too harsh to bring about the 
speedy Catholic surrenders that he envisaged, the parliament's failure either to 
endorse them formally or to propose an alternative approach deprived its 
representatives in Ireland of potential political alternatives to fire and sword.58     
 By the beginning of 1652 the collapse of Charles II's offensive in Britain 
and the inexorable advance of the parliament's forces in Ireland threatened to 
undermine any remaining Catholic resolve to continue in arms. Clerical efforts to 
bolster the war effort by resurrecting the confederacy and by brandishing the 
threat of excommunication had proven ineffective. The divisions and desperation 
among the Catholics at home had also been reflected in the continued 
negotiations with the duke of Lorraine. In this process, the strength of individual 
agents' attachment to the Stuarts was one of the factors that helped to determine 
the extent of the inducements that they offered to the duke. Clanricarde rebuked 
the city of Galway for addressing Lorraine as 'Protector Royal', but the lord 
deputy could do nothing to break Sir Charles Coote's tightening siege of that 
town, the last major port in Catholic hands.59 With even the boggy boltholes of 
Leinster coming under pressure from English military offensives, Colonel John 
Fitzpatrick moved to break the deadlock.    
 Fitzpatrick's surrender on terms in March 1652 provoked a decree of 
excommunication and a wave of condemnation from his comrades. Nonetheless 
it was soon followed by other large-scale submissions, with most of the men 
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concerned resigning themselves to exile. The only guarantee forthcoming on the 
practice of Catholicism was that it would not be permitted. The commissioners of 
parliament did promise, however, that nobody would be compelled to attend 
Protestant religious services or to pay recusancy fines.60 This approach opened 
up the possibility that lay Catholics' consciences at least would remain intact, but 
the same could not be said for their estates. Most of the surrender terms agreed 
around this time followed Ireton's qualifications in providing for the whole or 
partial confiscation of almost all Catholic estates. Apart from effectively bringing 
the war to an end, the most significant consequence of the surrender 
negotiations was the emergence of a more moderate approach to the issue of 
prospective capital punishments. Ireton had proposed to exempt from pardon 
any Catholic involved in the first year of the conflict, every Catholic cleric, and 
members of the first confederate general assembly. By mid-1652 it had been 
agreed instead that in practice only persons proved guilty of murder should face 
the ultimate penalty.61 It now fell to parliament to confirm the fate of a wasted 
population.  
 
Land and Power 
With the end of the Irish war in sight, Westminster turned its attention to the 
difficult questions of who precisely should govern Ireland and how exactly its 
vast tracts of confiscated land were to be divided up. The first of these questions 
quickly became bound up with republican concerns about the extent of army 
power and the threat that it posed to civil government. It was in this context that 
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John Weaver mobilised sufficient support in parliament to block the renewal of 
Cromwell's commission as lord lieutenant in April 1652. The abolition of the lord 
lieutenancy immediately undermined the position of Major-General John 
Lambert, who had been about to depart for Ireland to take up office as lord 
deputy. Weaver followed up this initial strike against military dominance of 
Ireland with a concerted campaign to limit the amount of land that would be 
granted to officers and soldiers in lieu of their substantial arrears of pay. At the 
same time the army's main competitors for Irish land, the civilian investors 
under the Adventurers' Act of 1642, were offered a range of inducements to 
encourage their plantation.62   
 This political struggle over authority and property in Ireland, which was 
part of the wider dispute between the parliament and army in England, was 
played out across the summer of 1652 and beyond.63 The appointment of 
Cromwell's son-in-law Charles Fleetwood to a dual role in Ireland as 
commander-in-chief and as a commissioner of the civil government was just one 
indicator that the balance of power was tipping in favour of the army. In early 
August parliamentary debate on a bill relating to the Irish land settlement 
ground to a halt, most likely because the officers in Ireland had yet to be 
consulted about it. Meanwhile Ireton's qualifications had resurfaced. With some 
amendments and additions arising from the recent surrender negotiations, they 
were passed as the Act for the Settling of Ireland on 12 August.64 Parliament's 
treatment of its Irish enemies had ultimately generated much less political 
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controversy than its policy towards its servants and friends. Yet it remained 
clear that much work was required to clarify and to elaborate on the finer details 
of the post-war settlement.   
 Back in Ireland, a High Court of Justice was swiftly established to deal 
with those accused of murder. The rebel-leader Sir Phelim O'Neill was one of 
several hundred persons condemned to death.65 In the absence of any major 
military threat, the English army officers found time to gather at Kilkenny in 
October to formulate their demands relating to the land settlement. They 
insisted on full satisfaction of their arrears before any land had been assigned to 
the adventurers. The officers entrusted the veteran officer Sir Hardress Waller 
with the task of representing their interests in London. He also continued their 
campaign against Weaver, who was still ensconced at Westminster and pushing 
for a substantial haircut on the debt owed to the Irish army. Weaver was 
eventually forced to resign from his Irish office in February 1653, after Waller 
had approached parliament with a lengthy petition of grievance signed by the 
officers in Ireland. Thereafter Waller secured some concessions relating to the 
army's share in the land settlement, but not without encountering further 
political resistance. This tense negotiation was still in progress when Cromwell 
expelled the parliament on 20 April.66  
 Before the nominated parliament convened in July 1653, the main 
elements of the Irish land settlement had been finalised and announced by the 
interim army-dominated council of state. It seems that much of the detail was 
carried over from the bill previously under consideration by the Rump 
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parliament. The provinces of Ulster, Leinster and Munster were designated for 
plantation, with the backbone provided by a joint adventurer-army plantation 
stretching across ten counties. Catholic land entitlements were to be satisfied in 
the western province of Connacht under a scheme of transplantation.67 The 
transplantation was central to the conquerors' vision of an anglicised and 
prosperous Ireland firmly attached to Protestantism. When the nominated 
parliament rubberstamped these arrangements, Fleetwood's government 
appeared well positioned to press ahead with the remaking of Ireland. He 
enjoyed strong support among the newcomers: the religious radicals and the 
army officers who served as governors of the administrative precincts into 
which the country was divided. Moreover he felt no inclination, and saw little 
need, to reach out to Ireland's established communities, whose power and 
influence had been decimated by conquest.68  
 
The Cromwellian Protectorate 
This situation was short lived. The power structures put in place at the end of 
1653 under the instrument of government rapidly altered the post-war political 
dynamic in Ireland. Cromwell's elevation to the position of lord protector proved 
especially disruptive. In the first place, it alarmed the radical interest in Ireland. 
Edmund Ludlow, one of Fleetwood's fellow commissioners, was just one of those 
who refused to accept the legitimacy of the protectorate.69 Secondly, the lord 
protector provided an alternative focus for Protestants and Catholics in Ireland 
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who hoped to improve their position by winning concessions on landholding and 
other issues. Although Fleetwood was appointed to the revived office of lord 
deputy in 1654, he could do little to prevent Cromwell from showing favour to 
various petitioners. The Munster Protestants ultimately secured the indemnity 
promised them at their surrender in 1649. The Ulster Scots also resorted to 
articles granted by Cromwell during the conquest as they sought to avoid 
transplantation to Munster. The success of Catholic appeals to Cromwell was 
much more limited, but the very fact that they were free to make them caused 
Fleetwood great distress. Irish Catholic agents maintained a prominent presence 
in London for much of the decade. They lobbied against transplantation and from 
1657 onwards they opposed efforts to enforce an anti-Catholic oath of abjuration 
in Ireland.70 The Catholics' political efforts to obstruct the land settlement 
coincided with the appearance of a pamphlet published anonymously by the 
Munster Protestant Vincent Gookin at the beginning of 1655. This trenchant 
critique of the policy of transplantation was in essence an unprecedented attack 
on Fleetwood's administration.71  
 The growing weakness of Fleetwood's position was confirmed when 
Cromwell sent his son Henry to replace him at the head of the Irish government 
later in 1655. Henry Cromwell worked to reduce the power of the radicals 
favoured by Fleetwood and gradually came to depend on the 'Old Protestants', 
both at the local and national levels. This grouping of pre-1641 settlers also 
successfully demonstrated the political potential of another of the measures put 
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in place in 1653: the admission of thirty MPs from Ireland to the protectoral 
parliaments. Their presence in parliament allowed the Old Protestants a formal 
input into debates on crucial issues such as trade, taxation and government. With 
leadership from Lord Broghill, they emerged as strong supporters of the 
Cromwellian regime and backed the proposal in 1657 to transform the 
protectorate into a hereditary monarchy. Cromwell's refusal to assume the 
crown thus came as a blow to Old Protestant hopes for a stable bulwark against 
political and religious radicals. His death in September 1658 further heightened 
their anxiety. When army leaders forced Richard Cromwell to resign in May 
1659, the progress made to date by the Old Protestants in recovering power and 
property appeared to be in jeopardy.72  
 
The General Convention 
With the Rump parliament back in power in England, Henry Cromwell was 
recalled from Ireland and efforts got underway to purge his supporters from the 
army and positions of influence. The political context was altered again in 
October when the Rump was once more shut down by the army. When George 
Monck decided to march from Scotland in support of the expelled MPs, Broghill, 
Coote and other officers in Ireland moved successfully to seize control of 
garrisons across the country. Thereafter it became apparent that the old 
Protestant leaders now in the ascendancy did not share the objectives of those 
who sought to restore a republican government. Ludlow was prevented from 
landing at Dublin and the regicide Waller was arrested there in February 1660. 
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By the end of that month a convention comprised of 138 members and 
dominated by the Old Protestants was in session in Dublin. Amongst its main 
priorities was the upholding of the recent massive transfer of Catholic lands into 
Protestant hands. The larger political issue of a return to Stuart monarchy was 
ultimately resolved elsewhere, when the English Convention parliament 
proclaimed Charles II king on 1 May 1660.73 
  
Four decades have passed since Patrick Corish warned that historians 
investigating the mid-seventeenth century in Ireland risked disturbing ghosts.74 
Other scholars have echoed him in summing up the period by referring to 
Protestant winners and Catholic losers. Regardless of the particular approach 
taken, the ghosts, as Corish recognised, can hardly be avoided. Nor should the 
violence that birthed them be detached from the political processes explored in 
this chapter. In the 1640s Irish politics was dominated by failure. Settlements 
reached in desperation proved fragile. It is no surprise, however, that disputes of 
the sort that ripped apart early modern Europe evaded political resolution either 
in Kilkenny or elsewhere in the three kingdoms. The conflict in Ireland 
eventually became what hardliners on both the Catholic and Protestant sides had 
long wished it to be: a fight to the finish. In this, the winners were Protestant; 
Catholics were disenfranchised, transplanted and transported. Elite politics in 
post-war Ireland reflected the transformation set in train by conquest. It was 
now largely an intra-Protestant sphere of action, more closely dependent on 
England than heretofore. In the midst of all this change, some continuity was 
                                                        
73 The period leading up the Restoration is explored in detail in A. Clarke, Prelude to restoration in 
Ireland: the end of the commonwealth, 1659-1660 (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
74 P. Corish, 'The Cromwellian regime, 1650-1660', in Moody et al. (eds.), A new history of Ireland, 
iii, pp 385-6. 
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evident. Catholic agents travelled to London seeking concessions and the 
fulfilment of promises, just as they did before 1641 and were to do again after 
1660. More significantly, the Old Protestants who had prospered prior to the 
rebellion gradually recovered influence in the 1650s. Their firm stance against 
any revival of Catholic political power would do much to shape the Ireland of 
Charles II.  
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